Statutory and Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Texas

Question Presented

1. State-level Speedy Trial Statutes (Texas):
   a. Do public health crises/similar unusual circumstances that cause courts to close/delay indefinitely, toll the period dictated in states speedy trial statutes?
   b. Notwithstanding the tolling period, do such crises/similar circumstances have any effect on defendants’ arguments of prejudice?

2. Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial:
   a. Do public health crises/similar unusual circumstances that cause courts to close/delay indefinitely affect the right to a speedy trial? If so, how?

Short Answer/Research Points

Question 1a.
Some states (such as Washington, New York and Wisconsin) have said that because COVID-19 has resulted in a state of emergency being declared, their speedy trial obligations have been tolled. Other states (such as Virginia, Missouri, and Texas) have shut down court operations with some limited exceptions, which include doing what is necessary to ensure litigants constitutional and/or statutory right to a speedy trial are upheld. Texas’s Supreme Court issued its official response to the current COVID-19 crisis on March 13, stating:

“Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in TX may in any case, civil, or criminal....without a participant’s consent: Modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order, for a stated period ending no later than 30 days after the Governor’s state of disaster has been lifted; allow or require anyone involved in any hearing, deposition, or other proceeding of any kind—including but not limited to a party, attorney, witness, or court reporter, but not including a juror —to participate remotely, such as by teleconferencing, videoconferencing, or other means; [and] consider as evidence sworn statements made out of court or sworn testimony given remotely, out of court, such as by teleconferencing, videoconferencing, or other means.”

Texas caselaw emphasizes the importance of asserting one’s right to a speedy trial only through a speedy trial motion—defendants should not move for a dismissal of all charges in the alternative. While the result of either motion, is a dismissal with prejudice, “[t]he constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not dismissal of the charges.”

**Question 1b.**
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution, guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial.3 Texas courts apply the same standard to enforce the state constitutional right to a speedy trial as federal courts use to enforce the Sixth Amendment right.4 That means that while the state and federal constitutional guarantees are independent, a person who claims their right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Texas law has been infringed will have their case assessed using a balancing test identical to the one in Barker.5 The factors weighed in that balancing test are the four “Barker factors:” 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) whether the defendant demanded a speedy trial and when; and 4) the prejudice or harm brought to the defendant’s case as a result of the delay. The Supreme Court in Barker stated that “[t]he length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism” and that “[u]ntil there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”6 So courts never get to the defendant’s specific argument that they were prejudiced (Barker factor 4) if the delay is not held to be presumptively prejudicial (Barker factor 1).

Prior to analyzing the factors as they’ve been interpreted by Texas courts, please note that no one factor is “either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.”8 Instead, the four factors are related and considered together along with other relevant circumstances.9

**Factor 1: The Length of the Delay**
The right to a speedy trial attaches once a person becomes “an accused”—either by being arrested or charged with an offense.10 The Sixth Amendment doesn’t provide any guidance on the time allowed for a trial to be considered “speedy.” State statutes on the other hand sometimes do.

Texas’s speedy trial statute does not include any reference to a time period, but case law is helpful in understanding when the Barker analysis is “triggered” by a delay unreasonable enough to be considered “presumptively prejudicial.”11 Case law further tells us that while no set time triggers the analysis, in general, a post-accusation delay of about one year is sufficient.12 In determining the length of delay, the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Judicial District in Texas has held that all time covered by “agreed resets” will not be included.13 This is significant because if a defendant signs an agreed reset for every setting from arraignment to trial they would have zero days on the speedy trial clock.

In Harris County it is engrained court procedure that when a case is to be rescheduled, “a reset agreement must be

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3 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; TEX. CONST. ART. I, § 10.
6 *Barker*, 407 U.S. at 530.
7 *Id.*
8 *Id.* at 533.
9 *Cantu*, 253 S.W.3d at 281.
10 *Zamarripa*, 573 S.W.3d at 514.
11 *Cantu*, 253 S.W.3d. at 281.
prepared by the attorney seeking the reset and concurred in by opposing counsel.” 14 This results in some defendant’s simply complying to fall in line with court room procedure and as a result, unknowingly agreeing to reset their cases speedy trial clock. In order for a defendant to preserve their right to a speedy trial/to prevent tolling the clock, they must refuse to sign the reset agreements. Assuming the individual at issue has avoided signing reset agreements or otherwise causing the delay at issue and over a year has passed since they became “an accused,” then the delay will likely be deemed “presumptively prejudicial” and the Court handling the individual’s motion will proceed in analyzing the other three Barker factors.

Examples:
- A delay of 38 months between indictment and trial requires a presumption of prejudice.15
- A three-and-a-half-year delay was held to be “patently excessive” and “presumptively prejudicial.”16

Factor 2: Reason for the Delay
It is the State that has the initial burden of justifying a lengthy delay.17 Barker tells us that deliberate attempts to delay a trial as a means of hampering the defense are weighed heavily against the government, whereas more neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded courts are weighed less heavily.18 Valid reasons, such as a missing witness, according to Barker, should serve to justify appropriate delay.19 When the state doesn’t provide a reason for the delay, “a court may presume neither a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid reason for the delay.”20 Meanwhile, delay attributable in whole or part to the defendant may be held to constitute a waiver of the speedy trial claim.21

Examples:
- The court of criminal appeals held that although the defendant was responsible for several months of the thirty-eight months delay, “a crowded court docket is not a valid reason for delay and must be counted against the State, although not heavily.”22
- “Although the trial court’s finding of a sixteen-month delay incorrectly failed to exclude the fifty-five day delay caused by an agreed continuance…. for no valid reason and despite Burckhardt’s insistence on a May 2, 1996 special setting, the State failed to bring Burckhardt to trial for fourteen months in…. a routine DWI case…. Burckhardt had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.”23

Factor 3: Whether, When and How the Defendant Asserted Their Right to a Speedy Trial
While the State has the duty to bring defendants to trial, defendants bear the responsibility of asserting their right to a speedy trial.24 SCOTUS has held that “invocation of the speedy trial provision...need not await indictment.”25 Further, “[a]lthough one cannot file a motion for a speedy trial until formal charges are made, the right to one can be asserted in other ways.”26 In Cantu, it was held that letters to the DA’s office requesting that a charging decision be made

15 Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890.
17 See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280-81; see also Starks v. State, 266 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App. 2008).
18 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; see also Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 889.
19 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
20 Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 313.
21 Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822.
22 Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 886.
24 Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282.
26 Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284.
expeditiously, coupled with follow up written reminders that the defendant desired a speedy trial and that time was passing, supported the defendants position that he wanted a speedy resolution prior to being charged. Furthermore, “[t]he longer [the] delay becomes, the more likely a defendant who wished a speedy trial would be to take some action to obtain it. Thus, inaction weighs more heavily against a violation the longer the delay becomes.” While failure to assert one’s right to a speedy trial does not constitute waiver of one’s right, “[w]hen the failure to assert the right [to a speedy trial] is made so late and never heard until trial, it weakens all the other factors because they are so dependent upon the assertion.”

Examples:
- Where the appellant failed to assert his right to a speedy trial for three and a half years, until just before trial, despite being represented by competent counsel at all relevant times, the appellant’s quiet acquiescence weighed “very heavily against finding a violation of the speedy trial right.”
- Where the appellant failed to assert his right to a speedy trial for thirty-one months, until just eighteen days before trial and because when he did, he moved to dismiss rather than asking for a speedy trial, the third Barker factor weighs against him.

**Factor 4: Prejudice or Harm Brought to the Defendant’s Case as a Result of the Delay**

This factor focuses on the prejudice, if any, suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. The common considerations when making this assessment include: 1) the oppressiveness of pretrial incarceration; 2) anxiety and concern of the accused; and 3) the possibility that the defense will be impaired as a result of the delay. Caselaw dictates starts by considering factor number 3.

3. Generally, a defendant has the burden of establishing that they were prejudiced by the delay. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that sometimes the length of the delay in of itself may be so excessive that it “presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or identify.” If that is the case, then the burden shifts and the defendant no longer has to prove that the delay prejudiced them by impairing their ability to present a defense. Even so, and in line with public policy, when the defendant acquiesces in the delay or the delay is persuasively rebutted then the State may prevail yet. In other words, while presumed prejudice relieves a defendant of the burden to prove that the delay prejudiced their ability to present a defense, it does not relieve them of their burden to show prejudice as to the other considerations under factor four; the prevention of pretrial incarceration and the minimization of the individual’s anxiety and concern.

Example:
- Four-year delay between defendant’s arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial to his defense.

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29 Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314-15.
32 See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280; see also Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890-91.
33 Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 812 (quoting Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890); see also Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 315.
34 Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 812.
35 See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658; see also Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890; Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 315.
If the delay does not relieve the defendant of their burden of showing they were prejudiced as a result of their defense being impaired, evidence that their defense was impaired must be demonstrated. In *Burckhardt*, the appellant contended that he lost “some potentially exculpatory evidence” and “several thousand dollars of income” as a result of the delay.\(^{37}\) While the State in *Burckhardt* argued that that didn’t establish prejudicial delay because the appellant was simply citing the “‘ordinary and inevitable delay in criminal proceedings,’” the court held that the appellant had sufficiently demonstrated that they’d been prejudiced.\(^{38}\) Actual prejudice is not required, an appellant “need only make ‘some showing’ that the delay has been prejudicial.”\(^{39}\) Once an individual makes a “prima facie showing of prejudice…the burden shift[s] to the State to show the prejudice was not serious, i.e., that it did not exceed that which occurs form the ordinary and inevitable delay.”\(^{40}\)

Keep in mind that impairment of the accused’s defense is the most important subfactor.

Examples:

- Appellant failed to make an initial showing of prejudice, as he did not show how the delay impaired his defense. Appellant’s counsel only made the bare assertion at the pretrial hearing that it was “‘pretty hard to get witnesses together…after all this time.’ The fact that it might have been difficult to procure witnesses…does not equate to those witnesses being unavailable. Even assuming that witnesses were unavailable, appellant did not inform the trial court of who those witnesses were, how their testimony would have been relevant, and what efforts he had made to get them to trial.”\(^{41}\)
  - The “[a]ppellee in State v. Smith relied on three bases to establish that his defense was impaired by the long delay in bringing his matter to trial: (1) the loss of a material witness; (2) diminished memory; and (3) inability to locate other witnesses.”\(^{42}\) The court ultimately decided based on the following analysis that the appellee failed to establish the delay impaired his defense.
    - (1) “The appellant testified the witness, a neighbor, would have corroborated his version of some of the events and much of his testimony. The record however, failed to indicate the appellant took any action to suggest the witness had material information about the case. In the nineteen months form the indictment to the trial, the appellant never attempted to interview the witness, take a sworn statement from him, or arrange for a trial subpoena to secure his attendance at trial. Based on these facts, we held the appellant did not establish undue prejudice….. Moreover, on cross-examination, appellee admitted he knew and had worked with Mathis’ two daughters for as long as he had worked with Mathis.”\(^{43}\)
    - (2) The appellee testified, “somewhat vaguely,” that his memory had diminished since the night of the alleged incident.\(^{44}\) Even if an individual losses memory in relation to the details of their alleged offense, that is not sufficient to establish prejudice. A defendant is required to show that any lapses of memory are in some way significant to the outcome of the case.\(^{45}\) An individual has to establish “how this loss was significant to the case other than [their] claim that [they] could recall the events better on the night of the alleged offense than [they] can

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\(^{37}\) 952 S.W.2d at 103.

\(^{38}\) Id.

\(^{39}\) Kuri, 846 S.W.2d. at 466 (quoting Phillips, 650 S.W.2d at 402-03).

\(^{40}\) State v. Smith, 76 S.W.3d 541, 552 (Tex. App. 2002).

\(^{41}\) Adkins, 2003 WI 1524138 at 4; see also Harris v. State, 489 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

\(^{42}\) 76 S.W.3d at 551.

\(^{43}\) Id. at 552.

\(^{44}\) Id. at 551.

\(^{45}\) See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534; see also Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 829.
now. Any showing of prejudice, was, at best, minimal.” 46

(3) “[A]ppellee was unable to specifically name one witness or state what material testimony any witness might have provided at trial. Additionally, appellee admitted that only he...and the alleged assault victim were witnesses to the event... [and that there] were no witnesses to the alleged offense that he wanted to subpoena. Finally, appellee’s counsel admitted he had never asked the State if there were other witnesses to the offense nor did he ask to review the offense reports filed in the case. We hold appellee’s vague assertions are insufficient to establish even minimal prejudice based on the inability to locate witnesses.” 47

1. Pretty obviously, oppressiveness of pretrial incarceration only factors into the prejudice calculation if the individual was incarcerated prior to trial. If they were released on bond or failed to be arrested, then this subfactor is not considered. Additionally, when an individual is incarcerated on another charge that carries with it more time than the delay in the case in question, pre-trial incarceration does not weigh in favor of the defendant’s speedy trial motion.

Examples:
  ▪ “Stock made a very strong showing of delay. First and foremost, he was incarcerated for one year awaiting trial.” 48

46 Smith, 76 S.W.3d at 553.
47 Id.
“Since Burckhardt was only incarcerated for five hours, there is no evidence indicating...[he] was subject to oppressive pretrial incarceration.”

“During most of the time in question, appellant was in state prison serving a life sentence for murder. ‘Under these circumstances we are...mainly concerned with whether or not appellant’s ability to defend himself was prejudiced.’”

2. Anxiety and concern exist in every criminal case and therefore alone, a defendant asserting they experience those feelings does not establish prejudice. In Cowart v. Hargett, it was held that “[a]nxiety about one's reputation and private life during pretrial delay” was insufficient to establish prejudice in a speedy trial claim. However, being able to show that the delay actually interfered with one’s employment prospects, or that travel back and forth to the trial setting was unduly burdensome, have resulted in establishing prejudice under this subfactor.

Example:

Burckhardt, an artist who lived in Los Angeles, flew to San Antonio each of the seven times his case was called to the docket. As a result, “the trial court found and the evidence establishes Burckhardt lost work.... [H]e lost a $125,000 tax-free payment when he lost [one of the] jobs. Finally, the trial court found Burckhardt ‘suffered anxiety and concern as a result of the delay,’ a finding supported by the record evidence establishing the disruptions to Burckhardt’s work and income stream ultimately forced him to rely on unemployment benefits.”

Speedy Trial Motions on Appeal:
When a trial court’s ruling on a speedy trial claim is under review, a bifurcated review standard is applied. Factual components are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and legal components, a de novo standard. Reviewing the Barker factors individually “necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions,” but the balancing test “as a whole” is a “purely legal question” that is reviewed de novo.

Barker Factors Potential Application to COVID-19 Case Facts:
If an individual who has been arraigned and is awaiting trial at this time in Texas moves to have their case dismissed on speedy trial grounds, the first step will be to calculate whether 1 year has passed or is likely to pass prior to trial commencing. If, subtracting days that are attributable to the defendant, more than 1 year has passed, then the case will turn on a careful analysis of its specific facts under the remaining three Barker factors.

Delays pursuant to COVID-19 resulting in courts being temporarily shut down or severely limiting their dockets, will presumably not be considered a deliberate attempt to delay the trial as a means of hampering the defense, which is the primary way that delay is held to weigh heavily against the government. Additionally, continuances requested by defense counsel on behalf of their client (ex. for fear of their own safety, for fear of their clients safety, because they don’t want to hold a jury trial amidst COVID for fear that those deemed healthy enough to serve won’t be an equitable representation of the defendant’s community/peers, for fear that the jury will rush to judgement to avoid having to break quarantine to continue to meet, for fear that witnesses won’t be available to attend court proceedings).

49 Burckhardt, 952 S.W.2d at 104.
50 Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 315 (quoting McCarty v. State, 498 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)).
51 16 F.3d 642, 647 (5th Cir. 1994).
52 Stock, 214 S.W.3d at 767.
53 Burckhardt, 952 S.W.2d, at 104.
54 See Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808; see also Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282.
55 Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282.
testify, etc.), will likely weigh against the defendant’s claim of presumptively prejudicial delay.

Case law suggests that there is no clear rule as to when a defendant must assert their right to a speedy trial for their assertion to weigh in their favor, but it’s safe to say that unless a defendant is asserting the right on the eve of trial, the third Barker factor will likely be held to weigh in their favor. This will likely be the case during COVID-19 as trials are largely not occurring (i.e. any speedy trial motions brought during this time will not occur on the eve of trial). Texas courts have established that an individual does not have to wait until formal charges are made to assert their right to a speedy trial and that the longer a delay becomes and an individual takes no action to assert their right to a speedy trial, the more their inaction is considered acquiescence and held against them in the Barker analysis. Defense attorneys who are unable to file formal motions on behalf of their clients during this time, or who represent individuals who have yet to be indicted, should still write letters to the DA’s office requesting that a charging decision be made expeditiously and/or pointing out that time is passing and their client is aware and is/will be asserting their statutory and Constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The fourth Barker factor is generally determinative and is where the bulk of the analysis surrounding COVID-19 delays will occur. As stated below, the NY Defense bar believes it is prejudicial to continue to hold jury trials during the COVID-19 crisis. Wisconsin’s Supreme Court order suspending jury trials and issuing a blanket waiver of the timeline attached to individuals’ right to a speedy trial, also argues why the delay won’t be held against the State or considered to damper individuals’ defense. Additionally, witnesses being unavailable would seem to be a bigger concern during the COVID crisis, as opposed to at a later date (though would-be witnesses who end up passing away due to COVID-19 might result in the defendant being prejudiced by the delay). To have this weigh in a defendant’s, assert with specificity who the missing or hard to procure (or perhaps in the context of COVID-19, dead) witnesses are/were, how their testimony is/would have been relevant, and what efforts have been made to procure their testimony to date. Anxiety and concern associated with being incarcerated in close quarters during a pandemic is undoubtedly at an all-time high. And while there is no case law to support the argument that increased prejudice is deemed to exist as a result, the argument will likely be made.

If COVID-19 tears through prisons and it is handled poorly, then prejudice will likely be easier to demonstrate (relative oppressive pretrial incarceration and anxiety and concern of the accused). Note also that in determining whether a defendant’s pretrial incarceration is considered prejudicial, courts have considered the potential jail time (sentencing guidelines) associated with their charges. With COVID-19 and

the increased danger prisons pose/potential exacerbation of other prejudices that weighs in the defendant's favor, criminal defendants who assert their right to a speedy trial has been denied are more likely to be successful if their charges are non-violent and carry the potential for limited jail time if held guilty.

While this analysis of Texas case law suggests the majority of criminal defendants will not succeed in moving to dismiss their cases due to COVID infringing on their constitutional/statutory rights, criminal defendants that are incarcerated for petty crimes with no trial date likely to be set for the foreseeable future, might have strong resultant speedy trial claims. This prediction, coupled with public health considerations, supports the release of all criminal defendants on bail who have been arraigned or are being held for non-violent crimes. Massachusetts, South Carolina, Washington, Michigan and New Jersey have already taken some action to decrease their incarcerated population in response to the pandemic.

**Question 2b.**

There is "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months."\(^{58}\) Previous tolling of the periods dictated in speedy trial statutes during national emergencies (9/11 and Katrina) with no finding that those closures weighing heavily against the government when analyzing the *Barker* factors, suggests that public health crises/similar unusual circumstances that cause courts to close/delay indefinitely affect the right to a speedy trial. However, Noah Feldman makes the textual argument in support of public health emergencies not being an acceptable reason for tolling constitutional speedy trials during pandemics, writing “[t]he Constitution says that habeas may not be suspended ‘unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.’ There’s no mention of a public health hazard – a situation that was certainly imagined to the framers of the Constitution, who themselves encountered yellow fever and smallpox epidemics as a recurrent part of the 18th century life in North America.”\(^{59}\) However, it is feasible that the argument could be made, although weak, that the virus constitutes an “invasion” of sorts. The dissent to Wisconsin’s Supreme Court order suspending jury trials includes a powerfully well written dissent arguing that public health crises tolling the delay used to demonstrate a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been infringed is unconstitutional.\(^{60}\)

**Texas Courts COVID-19 Related Changes/Closures:**

  - The website links to all the courts in Texas to provide information about their approach to COVID-19.

\(^{58}\) *Barker*, 407 U.S. at 523.


\(^{60}\) See Order of the Supreme Court of Washington (Mar. 22, 2020).
Statutory and Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic: TEXAS

“Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in TX may in any case, civil, or criminal....without a participant’s consent:”

- “Modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order, for a stated period ending no later than 30 days after the Governor’s state of disaster has been lifted;”
- “Allow or require anyone involved in any hearing, deposition, or other proceeding of any kind— including but not limited to a party, attorney, witness, or court reporter, but not including a juror—to participate remotely, such as by teleconferencing, videoconferencing, or other means;”
- “Consider as evidence sworn statements made out of court or sworn testimony given remotely, out of court, such as by teleconferencing, videoconferencing, or other means;”


Law Review Articles of Potential Interest:


Some of the States Issuing Blanket Waivers of the Timelines Attached to Individuals’ Right to a Speedy Trial:

- Washington State:
    - “[T]he Court specifically finds that the ends of justice served by ordering the continuances outweigh the best interests of the public and any defendant’s right to a speedy trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A)....[c]ase-by case exceptions to the continuances...may be ordered for non-jury matters at the discretion of the Court after consultation with counsel.”
    - The Court will vacate or amend this General Order no later than March 31, 2020.

- New York:
    - “Effective March 16, 2020, all civil and criminal jury trials in the SDNY scheduled to begin before April 27, 2020, are continued pending further order of the Court.”
“Nothing in this order is meant to affect jury trials that began prior to March 16, 2020, and have not yet concluded.”

“The Court is cognizant of the right of criminal defendants to a speedy and public trial under the Sixth Amendment, and the particular application of that right in cases involving defendants who are detained pending trial. Any motion by a criminal defendant seeking an exception to this order in order to exercise that right should be directed to the District Judge assigned to the matter in the first instance; provided, however, that no such exception may be ordered without the approval of the Chief Judge after consultation with the assigned judge.”

“Criminal matters before Magistrate Judges, such as initial appearances, arraignments, detention hearings, and the issuance of search warrants, shall continue to take place in the ordinary course.”

- This source suggests that an email was sent out to SDNY lawyers that states: “The running of speedy trial time will be suspended effective today due to the now-declared state of emergency and medical crisis.”

- Wisconsin:
    - The order relating to postponement of jury trials from March 22, 2020 through May 22, 2020 for a date after May 22nd. Note: The provision of this order shall be subject to further modification or extension by future orders of this court.
    - Governor Evers has declared a public health emergency for the State of Wisconsin.
    - Maintaining current court operations in the courts of this state, especially jury trials, presents substantial health risks to the public, to jurors, to witnesses, to law enforcement personnel, to litigants, to lawyers, to judges, and to court employees;
    - Continuing to have jury trials would put members of the public, jurors, witnesses, law enforcement personnel, lawyers, judges, and court employees at an unacceptable level of risk to their health and for some at an unacceptable level of risk for the loss of their lives;
    - Given the need to excuse jurors who are in high risk categories in order to protect them from exposure to this potentially deadly pandemic, the effect of such wide-ranging excusal from jury service could potentially raise challenges to the validity of a jury’s verdict or result in a miscarriage of justice. The increasing potential for a juror to become ill with COVID-19 during a trial, which would require isolation of all other remaining jurors and other participants in the trial, also creates an unacceptable potential for mistrials;
    - Those individuals who are healthy enough to serve on a jury would likely be distracted by, and anxious about, the physical environment of the trial and their deliberations. There is a substantial risk that jurors compelled to report for jury duty would not be able to “examine the evidence with care and caution,” and to “[a]ct with judgment, reason, and prudence,” as instructed by Wis. JI-Crim 140, or to “be very careful and deliberate in weighing the evidence,” as instructed by Wis. JI-Crim 460. In addition, jurors may be so affected by their anxiety from being in contact with other jurors and court staff that they cut short their deliberations so that they can be dismissed and leave the
courthouse;

- While this court cannot make findings as to particular cases (regarding whether their nature and complexity make it unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the time periods established by Wis. Stat. sec. 971.10), the court finds that the nature of individual cases is a factor that is of greatly less significance than the global factors it has identified and found in this order;
- Victims will also be subject to increased risk of contracting COVID-19 if they attend a jury trial during the public health emergency and they may be unable to attend a jury trial during the COVID-19 public health emergency because they are in a high-risk health category, which outweighs the impact on victims of the temporary delay in jury trials as a result of this order;
- The risks identified above may be significantly mitigated by temporarily modifying court operations, including a temporary suspension of jury trials. Indeed, failing to temporarily suspend jury trials in the courts of this state would create an unacceptable risk of a miscarriage of justice;
- The health risks from the COVID-19 pandemic constitute good cause to implement temporary changes to court procedures, including the temporary suspension of jury trials;
- The delay in conducting a jury trial that results from the temporary suspension of jury trials provided in this order is not due to the actions of the government, but is due to factors beyond the government’s control;
- Consequently, the ends of justice served by temporarily suspending jury trials in the courts of this state outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial under Wis. Stat. sec. 971.10(3)(a).
- Circuit courts or parties may file a motion with their court seeking an exception to this order. The motion has to be filed as an “EMERGENCY” motion on its face, and shall be filed as soon as possible.
  - NOTE: Justice Rebecca Bradley dissented to this order and is joined by Justice Daniel Kelly. Her dissent should be read in full, but I have included excerpts of it below.
    - “The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspends the constitutional rights of Wisconsin citizens, citing the exigency of a public health emergency. The Constitution does not countenance such an infringement.... Wisconsin’s highest court says a public health emergency justifies a blanket 60 day suspension of a constitutional right.... Informed by the lessons of history, the Constitution was established to safeguard the rights of the people even under the most exigent circumstances.”
    - Nothing in the Constitution permits the judiciary to limit the fundamental rights secured under the Sixth Amendment. "[T]here is only one instance in the Constitution where the government is expressly permitted to suspend a fundamental right[.]” Mitchell F. Crusto, State of Emergency: An Emergency Constitution Revisited, 61 LOY. L. REV. 471, 504 & n. 189 (2015); see U.S. CONST. ART I., § 9, cl. 2. Article I. § 9, cl. 2 provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." If the framers had contemplated suspension of Sixth Amendment rights or any other liberties, they would have said so in the text.”
    - “The court’s order not only overrides the United States Constitution, it flouts the Wisconsin Constitution, which mandates: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to a speedy public trial[.]" Wis. Const. Art. I, § 7. While utterly ignoring the supreme law of the land, the court expressly
refuses to follow statutory law.… Continuances are statutorily permissible, provided a circuit court considers multiple case-specific factors. See Wis. Stat. § 971.10(3). The broad sweep of the court’s order precludes every circuit court in the state from exercising its discretionary power to weigh various statutory factors—including the interests of the victim—before granting a continuance. See Wis. Stat. § 971.10(3)(b)(3).”

▪ If the people’s constitutional rights may be suspended by the judicial branch in the name of a public health emergency, our freedom is in peril; our republic is lost.

Some of the States Handling COVID Response Differently (Language Suggesting Blanket Waivers are Not Being Considered and Acknowledging the Need to Continue to Uphold the Constitutional Rights of Litigants):

▪ Virginia:
    ▪ This order is in effect from Monday, March 16, 2020 through April 6, 2020.
    ▪ Non-essential, non-emergency court proceedings in all circuit and district courts are suspended and all deadlines are tolled and extended for 21 days, absent an exception listed in the order applying.
      □ “Continue all…. criminal matters, including jury trials, subject to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, with the exception of emergency matters, including but not limited to quarantine or isolation matters, arraignments, bail reviews, protective order cases, emergency child custody or protective cases, and civil commitment hearings. Judges may exercise their discretion with regard to proceeding with ongoing jury trials, and in cases where the defendant is incarcerated.”
      □ “For jury trials that cannot be continued, excuse or postpone jury service for jurors who are ill, caring for someone who is ill, or in a high-risk category as defined by the CDC.”
The order references the Pandemic Influenza Bench Book for VA’s Court System, which can be found here: Pandemic Flu Preparedness Commission, Sup. Ct. of VA., Pandemic Influenza Bench Book for Virginia’s Court System (2017), http://www.courts.state.va.us/programs/pfp/benchbook.pdf.

- Although the capacity to conduct jury trials will likely be impacted during a pandemic, the constitutional rights to a speedy trial and an impartial jury will require courts to continue to perform this function.” (7-2)
- “Reduce the number of jury trials scheduled by postponing civil and other jury trials where there is not a speedy trial issue.” (7-2)

- “Nothing in this Order shall preclude the chief district and chief circuit judges from implementing additional local policies as needed.... To the extent possible, the courts and clerk’s offices shall remain operational and provide essential services.”


  - “All...criminal matters including jury trials are continued until after April 3, 2020. Any defendant with a speedy trial concern should contact their attorney and the court for further direction.”

- Missouri:

    - “All in-person proceedings in all appellate and circuit courts – including all associate, family, juvenile, municipal and probate divisions.” The suspension will last from Tuesday, March 17, 2020, through Friday, April 17, 2020, and may be extended by order of this Court as circumstances may want.

    - There are some exceptions listed—notably “proceedings necessary to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and juveniles, including the right to a speedy trial, and the rights afforded under 544.676.3,” “criminal jury trials...already in progress as of March 16, 2020,” and ‘other exceptions approved by the Chief Justice of this Court.”

    - “The presiding judge of each circuit court and the chief judges of each appellate court are authorized to determine the manner in which the listed in-person exceptions are to be conducted.... The judge presiding over proceedings has the discretion to exercise his or her discretion in excusing jurors or other individuals that cannot or should not appear as a result of risks associated with COVID-19.”

    - “Despite the suspension of in-person court proceedings, Missouri courts still must continue to carry out the core, constitutional functions of the Missouri judiciary as prescribed by law and continue to uphold the constitutional rights of litigants seeking redress in any Missouri court. Each courthouse should work with local law enforcement and county agencies to ensure that, to the extent possible, courthouses remain accessible to carry out essential constitutional functions and time-sensitive proceedings.”

States Taking Action to Decrease Their Incarcerated Populations (Massachusetts, South Carolina, Washington, Michigan, and New Jersey):

Statutory and Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic: TEXAS

State prisons and county jails in Mass. have released 367 prisoners after this month’s state Supreme Judicial Court ruling on reducing incarceration because of the coronavirus.

Jails released 296 prisoners in the past week. During that time, county jails—which hold more than 6,700 people—tested 338 prisoners/staff, and 116 people tested positive for COVID-19.

Four prisoners’ deaths linked to COVID-19 have been reported in Mass, and all of them involved inmates at the Mass Treatment Center in Bridgewater. It reported the first case of a prisoner testing positive with coronavirus on March 21.

As the health crisis has deepened, we have been forced to limit physical access to our court houses to address only "emergency matters that cannot be resolved through a videoconference or telephonic hearing, either because such a hearing is not practicable or because it would be inconsistent with the protections of constitutional rights," and have directed each trial court department to issue a standing order to determine what constitutes an emergency matter. Each trial court department subsequently has done so. We have emphasized, as well, that, "[i]n criminal cases, where appropriate, a defendant may ask the court for reconsideration of bail or conditions of release."

With respect to those individuals who are currently serving sentences of incarceration, absent a finding of a constitutional violation, our superintendence power is limited. Those who have been serving sentences for less than sixty days may move to have their sentences revised or revoked under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, as appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016) (Rule 29). Where there is no constitutional violation, however, art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights precludes the judiciary from using its authority under Rule 29 to revise and revoke sentences in a manner that would usurp the authority of the executive branch.

To afford relief to as many incarcerated individuals as possible, the DOC and the parole board are urged to work with the special master to expedite parole hearings, to expedite the issuance of parole permits to those who have been granted parole, to determine which individuals nearing completion of their sentences could be released on time served, and to identify other classes of inmates who might be able to be released by agreement of the parties, as well as expediting petitions for compassionate release... if the virus becomes widespread within correctional facilities in the Commonwealth, there could be questions of violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Experts warn that an outbreak in correctional institutions has broader implications for the Commonwealth’s collective efforts to fight the pandemic. First, the DOC has limited capacity to offer the specialized medical interventions necessary in a severe case of COVID-19. Thus, as seriously ill individuals are transferred from correctional institutions to outside hospitals, any outbreak in a correctional institution will further burden the broader health care system that is already at risk of being overwhelmed. Second, correctional, medical, and other staff enter and leave correctional institutions every day. Should there be a high concentration of cases, those workers risk bringing infections home to their families and broader communities.

Other States that have taken similar actions:

- The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, for example, issued a memorandum to all judges and court staff directing that "[a]ny person charged with a non-capital crime shall be ordered released pending trial on his own recognizance without surety, unless an unreasonable danger to the community will result or the accused is an extreme flight risk."

- The Supreme Court of Washington issued an order that, among other measures, declares that the COVID-19 pandemic shall be presumed to be a "material change in circumstances"
for the purposes of such motions for bail review if the individual has been identified as part of a vulnerable or at-risk population by the CDC, and that the pandemic may constitute a material change in circumstances and "new information" for all others seeking amendment of a prior bail order. The order designates as priority matters all motions for pretrial release and bail modification, as well as plea hearings and sentencing hearings that will result in the anticipated release of a defendant within thirty days of the hearing.

- The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan issued an order and further guidance instructing judges to "take into careful consideration" the present state of the COVID-19 emergency in making pretrial release decisions, including setting bail and conditions of release or probation. The Chief Justice later issued a statement directing that judges should release "far more people on their own recognizance" and "should use probation and treatment programs as jail alternatives." The statement called on judges and sheriffs to "use the statutory authority they have to reduce and suspend jail sentences for people who do not pose a public safety risk," and urged that "law enforcement should only arrest people and take them to jail if they pose an immediate threat to people in the community."

- The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered mediation in response to a petition from the State's Office of the Public Defender. The mediation resulted in a consent order that suspends or commutes county jail sentences for low-risk inmates in light of the public health crisis, unless a State or county prosecutor objects to the release of a particular individual. If there is such an objection, a judge or special master will hold a hearing to determine if release would pose a significant risk to the safety of the inmate or the public.

- For pretrial detainees, the petitioners contend that the risk of infection and death constitutes punishment prior to adjudication, which is not reasonably related to a legitimate government interest, and therefore is inconsistent with due process. For those who have been convicted and sentenced, the petitioners argue that due process protections are violated when the deprivations suffered are "qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime." _Vitek v. Jones_, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980).

- In making a determination whether release would not be appropriate, the judge should consider the totality of the circumstances, including (1) the risk of the individual's exposure to COVID-19 in custody; (2) whether the defendant, although not held in preventative detention pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, nonetheless would pose a safety risk to the victim and the victim's family members, witnesses, the community, or him- or herself if released; (3) whether the defendant is particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 due to a preexisting medical condition or advanced age; (4) for a defendant who is accused of violating a condition of probation, whether the alleged violation is a new criminal offense or a technical violation; and (5) the defendant's release plan.

- Following any arrest during the COVID-19 state of emergency, and until further order of this court, a judicial officer should consider the risk that an arrestee either may contract COVID-19 while detained, or may infect others in a correctional institution, as a factor in determining whether bail is needed as a means to assure the individual's appearance before the court. Given the high risk posed by COVID-19 for people who are more than sixty years of age or who suffer from a high-risk condition as defined by the CDC, the age and health of an arrestee should be factored into such a bail determination.

- Our broad power of superintendence over the courts does not grant us the authority to authorize courts to revise or revoke defendants' custodial sentences, to stay the execution of sentence, or to order their temporary release unless a defendant (1) has moved under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, within sixty days after imposition of sentence or the issuance of a decision on all pending appeals, to revise or revoke his or her sentence, (2) has appealed the conviction or sentence and the appeal remains pending, or (3) has moved for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30.
Speedy Trial Concerns Raised in the News:

  - The “public” part of [the speedy trial] protection is sometimes forgotten. It’s not absolute, and the Constitution may require it to apply only to trials, not to status conferences, say, or bail hearings. It’s an explicit right of the defendant, not necessarily of the public.
  - But public access to judicial court is an essential part of American liberty and cannot be cast aside lightly. The public has the right and obligation to monitor its criminal justice system.
  - The Los Angeles Superior Court is set to begin video coverage of some criminal and juvenile proceedings as soon as next week, but only a few courtrooms will be covered.
  - Stephen Munkelt, a criminal defense attorney in Nevada City, California, says many inmates in the system are pretrial detainees who have been arrested but not convicted, and cannot afford bail to get out.
  - “One of the greatest at-risk populations in an epidemic situation is people in prisons and jails. If a virus gets into that kind of institution, it’s very hard to slow it down or get rid of it,” Munkelt says, adding he would like to see officials immediately release nonviolent inmates.
  - Last week, Iranian officials released 70,000 prisoners in a bid to fight the coronavirus. On Tuesday, the judiciary in Iran announced it had temporarily freed more than 85,000 people.
  - “This disruption is going to create more avenues for pressure on those accused of a crime to plead guilty rather than going through the whole process to try and establish that they didn’t commit a crime,”
  - The 94 district courts and 13 circuit courts are grappling with how to handle the crisis. Each is crafting its own response in coordination with state and local health officials.
  - The judge overseeing the trial of a man charged in a NY sex trafficking ring postponed the trial for at least 2 weeks midway through testimony after defense attorney Alan Nelson raised concerns that the jury will rush to judgement to avoid traveling to the courthouse as the coronavirus pandemic was multiplying in the city.
    - The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers joined in support of the defense lawyers and called the government’s position (that the trial should continue) “dangerously obtuse.”
  - Courts were temporarily closed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks but some lawyers say the unknowns about the virus and how long it will last brings unprecedented challenges.
    - After 9/11 some cases were dismissed early and prosecutors were forced to reach premature settlements in others.
  - A NY federal judge on Monday allowed a juror in a criminal trial to deliberate by video conferencing over the objections of prosecutors.
  - In 2001 and this month, federal judges have turned to public interest exceptions in federal statures to ensure that courthouse disruptions would not count against deadlines guaranteed by a defendant’s
right to quick justice.
  ▪ In the aftermath of 9/11, the chief justice in the Southern District of NY issued a blanket order
discounting the time lost in cases from the initial closure against the “speedy trial” clock.
  ▪ Last week, Colleen McMahon made a similar judgement, excluding a time period
through the end of next month.

  o Courts are supposed to balance the four Barker factors for each particular defendant in deciding
whether their right to a speedy trial has been infringed, but most courts that have addressed the speedy
trial right during the coronavirus crises have issued or requested blanket waivers of the timelines
attached to individuals’ rights
  ▪ These broad proclamations fail to engage in the individualized speedy trial assessment that
SCOTUS suggested the Constitution requires and that Congress passed legislation to protect.

  o There is precedent to such an order—Gov. George Pataki suspended the speedy trial
requirements following 9/11. DA Soares argues that the current pandemic falls under the
“exceptional circumstances.”

  o On Monday, March 16th SCOTUS postponed oral arguments for the first time in over 100 years; the last
time it did so was in 1918 in response to the Spanish flu epidemic.
  o Courts in several states, including NY, Washington State, Texas, Connecticut, Missouri, Florida, Arizona,
Ohio and Virginia have suspended jury trials.
  o Michigan’s Supreme Court issued an executive order on Monday, March 16th, granting trial judges the
power to adjourn any civil and criminal matter if the defendant is not in custody and try to use
videoconferencing if the defendant is in custody.
  o In a statement on March 12, Dallas County Judge Clay Jenkins said he was suspending civil jury trials,
but not criminal ones, because the ‘inability to guarantee a speedy trial could result in cases being
dismissed.’

  o In New Hampshire all criminal cases in the state Superior Court were canceled for 30 days and juries
were ordered not to report.
  o Federal courthouses remain open in Seattle and Tacoma, but all other proceedings that require lawyers,
jurors or anyone else to show up to a courtroom have been suspended.
  o If too many people in high-risk categories were excused or unable to participate in jury duty, it could
raise civil rights concerns about whether juries would be adequately representative.

Statutes

Texas’s Speedy Trial Guarantee:

TEX. CONST. ART. I, § 10. Rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions.
Sec. 10. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, and shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both, shall be confronted by the witnesses against him and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, except that when the witness resides out of the State and the offense charged is a violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant and the State shall have the right to produce and have the evidence admitted by deposition, under such rules and laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide; and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on an indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment, otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger.
Additional Timing Considerations:
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 32A.01. Trial Priorities.

(a) Insofar as practicable, the trial of a criminal action shall be given preference over trials of civil cases, and the trial of a criminal action against a defendant who is detained in jail pending trial of the action shall be given preference over trials of other criminal actions not described by Subsection (b) or (c).
(b) Unless extraordinary circumstances require otherwise, the trial of a criminal action in which the alleged victim is younger than 14 years of age shall be given preference over other matters before the court, whether civil or criminal.
(c) Except as provided by Subsection (b), the trial of a criminal action against a defendant who has been determined to be restored to competency under Article 46B.084 shall be given preference over other matters before the court, whether civil or criminal.”

Cited Rule:

Case Law

Cited Cases:
  - The seminal SCOTUS decision discussing the right to a speedy trial. Justice Powell wrote that the right contemplates that “all accused persons be treated to decent and fair procedures,” and protects three main interests: the prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused; and the limitation of the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker sets out a balancing test, directing the consideration of the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his or her right and prejudice to the defendant.
- Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1994).
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